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Compensatory Education Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
The Third Circuit's Partially Mis-Leading
Position
Perry A. Zirkel*
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a funding
act' that dates back to 1975.2 The primary purpose of the Act is to
provide a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) to each child with
a disability.3 The vehicle for determining and delivering FAPE is a
team-based process, including parental participation, centered on an
"individualized education program" (IEP).4
The cornerstone for resolving disputes between parents and districts
* Perry A. Zirkel is University Professor of Education and Law at Lehigh
University and Co-Chair of the Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals Panel; Yale
University, LL.M.; University of Connecticut, J.D., Ph.D. The views expressed herein
are solely those of the author as professor and are not to be attributed to the appeals
panel.
1. The costs of special education average at least double that of regular education.
See, e.g,, Jay G. Chambers et al., What Are We Spending on Special Education Services
in the United States, 1999-2000? (2002), available at ERIC Document Reproduction
Service, Access No. ED471888. Yet, Congress only provides approximately twenty
percent of the difference. See, e.g., MITCHELL YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION
112 (2006).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2003). Its original name was the Education for All
Handicapped Children's Act. Id. § 1400(c)(2). Congress reauthorized the Act several
times, with successive refinements. The 1986 reauthorization imported the attorneys'
fees feature of civil rights legislation, such as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The 1990 reauthorization
included the name change to the IDEA. The most recent reauthorization, signed by
President George W. Bush on December 3, 2004, went into effect, in relevant part, on
July 1, 2005. The implementing regulations for the IDEA are at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300; those
pursuant to the most recent reauthorization are currently in proposal stage. 70 Fed. Reg.
35,782 et seq. (proposed June 21, 2005) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
3. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2003). FAPE consists of special education
and related services designed to address the needs of the individual eligible child. Id.
§ 1401(8); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (2004).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9) and 1414(d) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16 and
300.347 (2004).
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as to eligibility, FAPE, and other issues under the IDEA is an impartial
administrative adjudication.5 The IDEA gives states the choice of having
a one-tiered system, consisting solely of an impartial due process
hearing, or a two-tiered system, which includes an additional review
officer level.6 Subsequent to exhausting this administrative adjudication,
the aggrieved party has the right to judicial review in state or federal
court. During the pendency of these administrative and judicial
proceedings, the Act's so-called "stay-put" provision dictates that the
child remain in his or her current placement, i.e., the placement where
the child was when the parent originally filed for a due process hearing.8
Finally, the Act not only accords judges the authority to award attorneys'
fees in specified circumstances, 9 but also, without further specification,
requires them to grant "such relief as the court determines is
appropriate."' 0 However, the Act and its accompanying regulations" are
largely silent about the remedial authority of the impartial hearing/review
officers. 12
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2004). The
other dispute resolution mechanism, which is purely administrative and without judicial
review, is the state complaint resolution process. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-300.662. On the
other hand, mediation is an adjunct to the hearing/review process. Id. § 300.506.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510 and 300.512
(2004). Currently, approximately seventeen states have a second, review-officer tier,
with the remaining thirty-four states opting for a one-tier, state-level hearing officer
system. Eileen Ahearn, Due Process Hearings: 2001 Update, QTA: PROJECT FORUM 2
(April 2002), http://www.nasdse.org/publications.cfm.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a) (2004). The
resulting concurrent jurisdiction can cause problematic differences. See infra note 19.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 14150) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.514 (2004).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (2004).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b)(3) (2004).
11. In contrast, the regulations accord the state complaint process, which is the
alternate administrative dispute resolution mechanism, express remedies, including
expense reimbursement and compensatory education. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660(b)(1) and
300.662(c) (2004).
12. There are limited exceptions. The first is an injunction, analogous to the judicial
authority construed in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), to change the placement of the
child on an interim basis in narrowly specified, danger-based disciplinary circumstances.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(2) (2003). Based on additional language in the regulations in terms
of the district proposing the interim placement, the hearing officer's determination is
arguably only declaratory, rather than injunctive, relief. 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(d) (2004).
A second limited exception is the declaratory or injunctive authority, unless inconsistent
with state law, to override a refusal of parental consent to an initial evaluation or re-
evaluation. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(b). Conversely,
however, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization codified the administering agency's
interpretation that hearing officers lack such overriding authority for parental refusals of
consent for initial services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(l)(D)(ii) (2004); see also Letter to
Manasevit, 41 IDELR 36 (OSEP 2003); Letter to Gagliardi, 36 IDELR 267 (OSEP
2001); Letter to Cox, 36 IDELR 66 (OSEP 2001). Third, the IDEA specifically grants
hearing officers, not only judges, the authority to issue tuition reimbursement; however,
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In thirty years of litigation under the IDEA,13 which has continued
to expand counter to the overall trend in education litigation, 4 courts
have administered various traditional forms of relief, primarily in the
form of the injunction-based, specialized equitable remedies of tuition
reimbursement' 5 and compensatory education.' 6 The courts have also
provided derivative authority to hearing/review officers, along with
increasingly demarcated boundaries and standards, for these two
remedies.'
7
The Third Circuit and the Pennsylvania courts have been leaders in
filling in the wide gap in the IDEA as to appropriate remedies.
1 8
However, on occasion, these two court systems, which have concurrent
jurisdiction under the IDEA, have arrived at conflicting answers relating
in odd partial contradiction it limits the equitable step to "a judicial finding of
unreasonableness." See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (emphasis added); see also 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.403(c) and 300.403(d)(3). Finally, in limiting the hearing officer's
authority to find a denial of FAPE on circumscribed, basically prejudicial procedural
violations, the 2004 IDEA reauthorization expressly recognized a hearing officer's
authority to order a district to comply with the Act's pertinent procedural requirements.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii). More specifically, the prescribed prejudicial
procedural violations are limited to those that impeded or denied a child's right to FAPE
and those that "significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the
decisionmaking process regarding the provision of [FAPE]." Id.
13. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel & Anastasia D'Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An
Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 731 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The "Explosion " in Education Litigation: An Update, 114
EDUC. L. REP. (West) 341, 346-49 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Thomas Mayes & Perry Zirkel, Special Education Tuition
Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 350
(2001).
16. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, Compensatory Education Services under the IDEA: An
Annotated Update, 190 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 745 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing/Review Officers
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. _
(forthcoming June 2006). In contrast, the courts agree that hearing/review officers have
no authority to grant money damages under the IDEA. Id.
18. Id. The Third Circuit has also played a leading position in other IDEA issues,
such as extended school year, Battle v. Commonwealth, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980);
inclusion, Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); FAPE, Fuhrmann v. E.
Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1993); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988); Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d
987 (3d Cir. 1986); independent educational evaluations, Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch.
Dist., 205 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2000); Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190
F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 1999); attorney's fees, John T. v. Commonwealth, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir.
2003); Woodside v. Sch. Dist., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); "stay-put" provision,
Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 1996); Drinker v. Colonial Sch.
Dist., 78 F.3d 859 (3d Cir. 1996); DeLeon v. Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d
149 (3d Cir. 1984); and early intervention, Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 420
F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); Bucks County Dep't of MH/MR v. Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61
(3d Cir. 2004).
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to remedies under the IDEA.' 9
The purpose of this Article is to describe, evaluate, and propose
revisions for the Third Circuit's approach to remedies under the IDEA,
with primary attention to compensatory education. The first part of the
Article summarizes the United States Supreme Court's two foundational
decisions, which established the availability of and criteria for the
remedy of tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. The second part of
the Article addresses the Third Circuit's IDEA interpretations with
regard to IDEA remedies, particularly compensatory education. The
third part of the Article traces the relevant Congressional provisions in
the successive reauthorizations of the IDEA, which focus on tuition
reimbursement. Finally, the fourth part of the Article illustrates the
confusion in the Third Circuit's approach and suggests a more coherent
and consistent approach for compensatory education, which is informed
by the Congressional and judicial development of tuition reimbursement.
I. Supreme Court: The Burlington-Carter Foundation
Aside from general declaratory and injunctive relief, the major
remedy available to hearing/review officers and courts under the IDEA
has been tuition reimbursement. 20  A pair of United States Supreme
Court decisions established the availability of and boundaries for tuition
reimbursement in IDEA cases. In its 1985 decision in Burlington School
Committee v. Department of Education,2' the Court held that the Act's
broad discretionary grant of appropriate relief includes tuition
reimbursement where the district's proposed IEP "calling for placement
in a public school" is determined to be inappropriate and the parent's
unilateral placement is determined to be appropriate.22 Based upon the
Court's concluding comment endorsing the lower court's balancing of
the equities, without ruling on specific equitable factors considered,23
most commentators and lower courts have read Burlington as
19. The prime illustration is the limitations period applicable to compensatory
education under the IDEA. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The Statute of Limitations under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Is Montour Myopic? 12 WIDENER L.J. 1
(2003). The conflicting interpretations of the federal and state courts have led to costly
gamesmanship. See, e.g., Robert R. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR 1 186 (Pa.
SEA 2005).
20. See Zirkel, supra note 17.
21. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
22. Id. at 369-70. Interpreting the broad statutory grant of remedial authority, the
Court reasoned that "the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be
'appropriate' in light of the purpose of the Act... [which] is principally to provide
handicapped children with a [FAPE]." Id. at 369.
23. Id. at 374. "We do think that the [lower] court was correct in concluding that
[the IDEA provision for] 'such relief as the court determines is appropriate' ... means
that equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief." Id.
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establishing a three-part test for tuition reimbursement: 1) is the
district's proposed IEP appropriate, 2) if not, is the parent's unilateral
placement appropriate, and 3) if so, do the equities favor reducing or
denying reimbursement? 24 The Court reached its conclusion by finding
that the Act's overriding purpose of providing the eligible child with
FAPE trumps the stay-put provision and, in light of the Act's
"ponderous" review process, warrants such a remedy.25 The Court also
reasoned that tuition reimbursement balances cost considerations because
the parent is making such a unilateral placement "at their own financial
risk,, 26 whereas "[r]eimbursement merely requires the [district] to
belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have
borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP.,
27
In its 1993 decision in Florence County School District Four v.
Carter,28 the Court held that when analyzing step two of this three-part
test, the requirements for determining the appropriateness of the parent's
unilateral placement are not as stringent as those that apply to the
district's proposed placement in step one. More specifically, the Court
ruled that neither the IDEA's IEP prescriptions, nor its related state
standards, applied to the parent's unilateral placement. In its opinion, the
Court also clarified that tuition reimbursement comes under the "IDEA's
grant of equitable authority,, 29 and that the equitable considerations in
step three of the test include the reasonableness of the cost of the parent's
placement.
30
II. Third Circuit: IDEA Remedies
A. Third Circuit: Tuition Reimbursement and Compensatory
Education
After Burlington, the Third Circuit developed its initial analytical
framework for tuition reimbursement and compensatory education. In
the first pertinent decision, the Third Circuit followed the Eighth
Circuit's view that, analogous to tuition reimbursement, compensatory
24. See, e.g., Mayes and Zirkel, supra note 15. The IDEA's subsequent codification
confirms this three-part framework, including the role of the equities. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 403(c)-(e) (2004).
25. 471 U.S. at 370.
26. Id. at 374. It premised this choice on the parent having adequate financial means
and being reasonably confident of the eventual adjudicative outcome. Id. at 370.
27. Id. at 370-71. In expressing this conclusion, the Court explicitly rejected the
district's characterization of this remedy as constituting money damages. Id. at 370.
28. 510 U.S. 7(1993).
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. at 16.
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education was within courts' equitable authority under the IDEA as a
remedy for denials of FAPE.31 More specifically, the Third Circuit
characterized the Eighth Circuit as extending the Burlington rationale to
compensatory education by "reasoning that compensatory education, like
tuition reimbursement, cures the deprivation of a handicapped child's
statutory rights. 32  Borrowing the Eighth Circuit's rationale that
Congress did not intend a disabled child's entitlement to FAPE to depend
upon the parent's ability and choice to "front" the costs of the education,
the court concluded that "Congress, by allowing the courts to fashion an
appropriate remedy to cure the deprivation of a child's right to...
[FAPE], did not intend to offer a remedy only to those parents able to
afford an alternative private education. 33 In dicta,34 the court identified
the following issues, set forth in the opinion, that it would revisit with
definitiveness in later decisions: 1) whether, as the court suggested,
hearing/review officers lacked authority to grant compensatory
education, 35 and 2) whether the district's good faith efforts to provide
FAPE entered into the calculus of awarding a remedy of compensatory
31. Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Miener v. State
of Missouri, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (Miener II)). Even before Burlington, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that compensatory education is "practically indistinguishable
from a request for [tuition] reimbursement." Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969,
982 (8th Cir. 1982) (Miener I). For other circuits' recognition of the analogy based on
Burlington, see Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 1991);
Pihl v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993); Burr v. Ambach,
863 F.2d 1071, 1078 (2d Cir. 1988); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d
853. 857-68 (1 1th Cir. 1988). Lower courts have also recognized the analogy, deriving
compensatory education from tuition reimbursement. See, e.g., White v. State, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 742 (Ct. App. 1987).
32. 916 F.2d at 873 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 873.
34. Additionally, whether dicta or not, the court's ruling in this case may be
misinterpreted that the implementation of compensatory education is limited to the period
beyond age 21. In this particular case the Third Circuit upheld the district court's
preliminary injunction, without exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative remedies, that
the child, who was age 21 and had profound retardation, was entitled to thirty months of
compensatory education beyond the statutory ceiling of age 21. The period of
implementation is traceable in this case to the parent's particular request. Id. at 868.
Although this issue is still subject to some judicial confusion, the majority and clearly
better view is that implementation need (and should) not be delayed, but that age 21 is
not a barrier just as long as the denial of FAPE occurred, as Lester H. reasoned, before
age 21. Id. at 872. See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 16, at 748 nn.15-16. Being prospective,
it should be in addition to whatever the child receives under the current, appropriate IEP;
in most cases, there is ample implementation time after school, during weekends, and
during vacation breaks without waiting for the child to pass through a bona fide
graduation or the statutory age range.
35. 916 F.2d at 870. The modem view is quite the opposite. See, e.g., Zirkel, supra
note 16, at 747 n.l 1 (citing various lower court decisions and OSEP policy letters);
Zirkel, supra note 17.
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education.36
Next, in a 2-to-i decision in Bernardsville Board of Education v.
J.H.,37 the Third Circuit formulated an equitable limitations period for
filing for a due process hearing for the remedy of tuition reimbursement,
specifically ruling that "more than one year, without mitigating excuse, is
an unreasonable delay. ' 38  The court reached this conclusion by
reasoning that such a limitation on the filing period provides the district
with clear notice of the parent's intent, so that the district has a "practical
opportunity '39 to rectify the matter via a proposed revision to the IEP.
Thus, while recognizing that the district has the obligation to provide
FAPE, the court concluded that "the right of review contains a
corresponding parental duty to unequivocally place in issue the
appropriateness of an IEP., 40 Although equitably appropriate in terms of
relief, this analysis poses a problem in terms of the applicable statute of
limitations period: unlike IDEA case law generally, the Third Circuit
does not use the borrowing analysis that is typically used in determining
the statute of limitations for federal laws that do not specify a limitations
period.41
The following year, the Third Circuit ruled that compensatory
education required a denial of FAPE, but not that the denial be motivated
by bad faith.42 This conclusion is consonant with tuition reimbursement
analysis: at step one, the requirement for reimbursement is a denial of
FAPE, regardless of culpability.
The problem of conflicting and contradictory treatment of the two
36. 916 F.2d at 873 n.12. For the Third Circuit's subsequent resolution of this issue,
see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
37. 42 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1994). Judge McKee dissented in relevant part, rejecting a
reciprocal duty on the parent and arguing instead for a totality test, which included notice
to the district as only one of three stated factors. Id. at 162-64.
38. Id. at 158. Without further specification, the court explained the exception as "a
consideration of mitigating circumstances for any delay in the initiation of review
proceedings which might otherwise be deemed unreasonable." Id. at 158 n.14.
39. The court explained that the filing of a prompt complaint presents the alternative
of obviating the possibly excess expenditures of a private placement. Id. at 157.
40. Id. Noting that "a balancing of the equities is unavoidable" under the broad
framework of the Act, the court further explained its rights-duty analysis by reasoning
that the district and the parent have a common interest on behalf of the child's right to
FAPE, create mutual duties: "on the district to develop and justify its IEP, and on the
parents to unambiguously challenge the IEP when they think it is appropriate." Id. at 158
n.14.
41. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel & Peter Maher, The Statute of Limitations under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 175 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 1, 2 (2003).
42. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995). The court
disagreed with the Second Circuit's view that required more culpable conduct, such as a
gross denial of FAPE. Id. at 537 (citing, e.g., Garro v. State of Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734
(2d Cir. 1994)). The court also ruled that the burden of proof at step two rests on the
parent. Id. at 533.
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remedies arose in the Third Circuit's 1996 decision in M.C. v. Central
Regional School District,43 specifically in the court's accrual analysis,
which was part of an otherwise equitable "flesh[ing] out" 4 4 of the
standard for compensatory education. In the problematic part of the
opinion, the Third Circuit ruled that "the right to compensatory
education... accrue[s] from the point that the school district knows or
should know of the IEP's failure. 45 Moreover, the Third Circuit noted
two limitations on the right to compensatory education: an exception for
de minimis denials of FAPE, and a deduction for a reasonable
rectification period. Thus, balancing what initially appear to be
Bernardsville-type interests 46 of the child in receiving FAPE, and of the
district in avoiding excess costs, the court held as follows:
A school district that knows or should know that a child has an
inappropriate IEP or is not receiving more than a de minimis
educational benefit must correct the situation. If it fails to do so, a
disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a period
equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding the time reasonably
required for the school district to rectify the problem.
47
The Third Circuit's divergence in M.C. from its majority decision in
Bernardsville is evident in the court's reasoning in M.C. that although
actual knowledge or bad faith serve to strengthen the parent's case, "a
child's entitlement to special education should not depend upon the
vigilance of the parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to
comprehend the problem)." 4  The court failed to mention, much less
attempt to distinguish or harmonize, its limitations period approach for
tuition reimbursement with its accrual analysis for compensatory
education.49
43. 81 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996).
44. Id. at 396.
45. Id. at 396-97.
46. See supra notes 39-40.
47. 81 F.3d at 397.
48. Id. The parenthetical qualified assumption compounds the problem. What if the
parents are, as is often the case in tuition reimbursement litigation due to the associated
fiscal means and legal assessment (see supra note 26), sufficiently sophisticated? For a
specific example, see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. Moreover, such lack of
vigilance, which equates to passive conduct, does not eliminate the equitable
consideration of active bad faith, exemplified by obstructionist conduct.
49. The accrual analysis poses three other problems in relation to IDEA case law
generally. First, as with Bernardsville, the court ignored the applicable borrowing
analysis. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Second, most courts pinpoint
accrual in terms of when the parent, not the district, had constructive or actual knowledge
of the alleged violation. Third, for stage one (i.e., due process hearing, as contrasted with
stage two, being judicial review), these same courts generally distinguish accrual, which
is the date period begins to run, from the statute of limitations, or length of this period.
[Vol. 110:4
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The unjustified distinction continued in Ridgewood Board of
Education v. N.E.,5° where the court applied MC. to 1) confirm that
"failure to object to [the child's] placement does not deprive him of the
right to an appropriate education [here in the form of compensatory
education relief]," 51 and 2) remand the case for the lower court to
determine whether the district failed to provide the child with FAPE for
each of the disputed previous eight years and when the district had
constructive or actual knowledge of the denial.52 Furthermore, the court
seemed to confirm that its accrual approach was equivalent to a
limitations period for compensatory education at the due process hearing
stage by separately determining the limitations period for the subsequent,
judicial stage and, in contrast, using "accrual" as the starting point of the
period for compensatory education at this initial stage.53
In the same year as Ridgewood, the Third Circuit issued another
decision that compounded the confusion over the requirements for tuition
reimbursement when it made the following interpretations with regard to
tuition reimbursement: 1) it relied on Bernardsville for the stage one
(i.e., due process hearing)54 limitations period, 55 2) it construed
Bernardsville as providing an immediate limitations period with a one-
year exception for mitigating circumstances, 56 and 3) it refused to allow
unreasonable parental conduct to enter into step three of the equitable
See, e.g., R.R. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 338 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003); James v. Upper
Arlington City Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2000); Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified
Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994); Mandy S. v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR
79 (N.D. Ga. 1999); cf Murphy v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 1186 (1st Cir.
1993) (compounded with continuing-violation and laches theories).
50. 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).
51. Id. at 250 (citing M.C. "vigilance" reasoning).
52. Id.at251.
53. Id. The resulting open-ended limitations period for compensatory education at
stage one and the differential treatment for tuition reimbursement are out-of-step with all
of the other judicial interpretations of the applicable limitations periods. See Zirkel &
Maher, supra note 41, at 6-7. Further, keying the accrual of the limitations period
exclusively to the district's actual or constructive knowledge is contrary not only to the
IDEA 2004 amendment's triggering of the limitations period to "the date the parent or
district knew or should have known," but also, less directly, to the Supreme Court's
recent ruling that the burden of proof in cases concerning the appropriateness of an IEP is
on the challenging party, which almost always is the parent. 20 U.S.C.A. §
1415(f)(3)(C) (2005) (emphasis supplied); Shaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 508 (2005).
54. Not to be confused with the three-step test for tuition reimbursement, the IDEA's
adjudicative dispute resolution system gives rise to two stages of a statute of
limitations-one for the due process hearing and the other for subsequent judicial review.
See, e.g., Zirkel & Maher, supra note 41, at 34.
55. Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 84. "Bernardsville does not establish a one-year grace period as plaintiffs
argue. In Bernardsville, parents who waited over two years to initiate proceedings were
denied reimbursement for the entire two-year period and were not simply excused for
their first year of inaction." Id.
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analysis. 57  Furthermore, the court recognized that the 1997 IDEA
amendments expressly contradicted its approach to unreasonable parental
misconduct, but pointed out that this case arose prior to the effective date
of the 1997 amendments.58
B. Third Circuit: Money Damages
Although the focus here is on compensatory education with regard
to the Third Circuit's failure to follow the analogy of tuition
reimbursement, the Third Circuit's approach to compensatory damages
further reflects its lack of cogency and consistency in its provision of
remedies for students with disabilities. In W.B. v. Matula,5 9 the Third
Circuit held that money damages were available to students bringing
§ 1983 claims to enforce the IDEA60 and § 504.61 The problem with the
court's allowing money damages with respect to § 504 is that the court,
in its cursory analysis, followed the Eighth Circuit's lead with regard to
the availability of money damages 62 without addressing, much less
adopting, the Eighth Circuit's limiting standard-that generally prevails
elsewhere 63 -of bad faith or gross misjudgment. 64  Similarly, with
respect to the IDEA, the court relied in notable part on its own case
law,65 whereas more careful analysis reveals that the clear majority6 -
57. Id. at 85-86. The court appeared to allow for a possible exception where the
parent's conduct obstructed the district from presenting an appropriate IEP. Id. at 86.
58. Id. at 86 n.3 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(lII) (2003), which expressly
allows judicial reduction or denial of tuition reimbursement upon a finding of
unreasonable parental conduct).
59. 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
60. However, the court advised: "We caution that in fashioning a remedy for an
IDEA violation, a district court may wish to order educational services, such as
compensatory education.., or reimbursement for.., private expense. .. , rather than
compensatory damages for generalized pain and suffering." Id. at 495.
61. Id. at 494-95. The court also held that money damages were available directly
under § 504. Id. at 494.
62. Id. at 494 (citing Rodgers v. Magnet Cove Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir.
1994) and Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir. 1994)).
63. See, e.g., M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2003);
Smith v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 1999). As these more
recent cases confirmed, this standard dates back in the Eighth Circuit to a decision in the
early 1980s. Monahan v. State of Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982).
64. See, e.g., M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2003); Smith
v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999); Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d
524 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 168 (1999); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch.
Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'dmem., 181 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1999); Gabel
v. Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Butler v. South Glens Falls Cent.
Sch. Dist., 106 F. Supp. 2d 414 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); cf Swenson v. Lincoln County Sch.
Dist. No. 2, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Wyo. 2003); Smith v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No.
6, 34 IDELR 201 (D. Me. 2001) (deliberate indifference).
65. 67 F.3d at 495. Even among the cases cited in W.B., only one was specific to
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and better view67 -with or without the addition of § 1983, is in the
opposite direction. Although again failing to specify a limiting standard
for such relief, the court at least warned that "in fashioning a remedy for
an IDEA violation, a district court may wish to order... compensatory
education... or [tuition] reimbursement... rather than compensatory
damages for generalized pain and suffering., 68 The court's confusion-
occasioned by the incantation of § 1983--of the IDEA with civil rights
acts, such as § 504, is further evident in its imposition of a heightened
standard for the enforceability of settlement agreements under IDEA.69
III. Congress: Successive IDEA Amendments
The original version of the IDEA, which was the Education of the
Handicapped Children's Act of 1975, cryptically clothed courts with the
authority to grant "appropriate relief.",70 The successive reauthorizations
money damages as contrasted with other forms of relief. The court also relied on and
overstated its previous ruling in Board of Education v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.
1986). Rather than holding in Diamond that compensatory damages are available to
enforce IDEA violations, as the W.B. court maintained, the Diamond court held "no more
at this [preliminary] stage" than "we cannot say that [the plaintiffs] could not prove a set
of facts upon which compensatory damage relief could not be granted for violation of the
Constitution or the laws of the United States." 808 F.2d at 996. Diamond did not make
clear whether the § 1983 claim for such relief was predicated on the IDEA, as contrasted
with § 504 or the Fourteenth Amendment, and even if so, what the standard would be for
said relief.
66. Compare Ortega v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2005);
Nieves-Marquez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 40 IDELR 90 (1st Cir. 2003);
Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d
1268 (10th Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Bd. of Educ. 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998); Sellers v.
Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998); Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.
1996); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382 (6th Cir.
1992), with Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 248 F. Supp. 2d 936 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); Zearley v. Ackerman, 116 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2000); L.C. v. Utah State
Bd. of Educ., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Utah 1999). The Supreme Court's decision in
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2001) would seem to at least modestly
strengthen the majority view. See, e.g., Ralph Mawdsley, A Section 1983 Cause of
Action under IDEA? 170 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 425 (2002).
67. See, e.g., Rebecca Bouchard, The Relationship Between the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and Section 1983: Are Compensatory Damages an Available
and Appropriate Remedy? 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 301 (2003); Terry Jean Seligman, A
Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L.
REv. 465 (2001).
68. 67 F.3d at 495. Moreover, in a recent unpublished opinion that rejected such
liability in the absence of clearly identified and quantifiable injury, the Third Circuit
characterized Matula as only allowing money damages "in certain § 1983-based IDEA
claims." C.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Union County Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 128 Fed. Appx.
876, 880 (3d Cir. 2005).
69. 67 F.3d at 497-98. For the significant differences, see, e.g., Perry Zirkel, A
Comparison of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Section 504/ADA, 178
WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 629 (2003).
70. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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of the IDEA did not provide any further clarification until the 1997 and
2004 amendments.
A. IDEA 1997
In the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, Congress codified the
Burlington-Carter framework, adding certain refinements to this case
law. 7 1  The refinements included the express confirmation of various
boundaries of equitable remedies. One of these clarifications was that
unreasonable parental actions may cause the reduction or elimination of
an otherwise warranted tuition reimbursement award (i.e., one that
fulfilled steps one and two).72  This refinement serves, as
aforementioned,7 3 as a correction of the Third Circuit's view of
unreasonable parental conduct. Another provision added to reinforce and
structure the equitable nature this relief was the requirement that parents
provide timely written notice of the intended unilateral placement and the
reasons for their rejection of the district's proposed IEP.74 This provision
appears to endorse the Bernardsville approach,75 but attaches it to an
earlier stage than the filing for due process. 76  This provision also
71. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 403(c)-(e) (2004). The
commentary to the regulations seem to suggest that, in the Department of Education's
view, hearing/review officers and courts' authority under Burlington-Carter extends
beyond the specific boundaries of the Amendments. 64 Fed. Register 12,602 (Mar. 12,
1999). Indirectly addressing this question, the federal appellate courts have disagreed as
to whether the express statutory prerequisite about the child's previous receipt of special
education is absolute. Compare M.M. ex rel. C.M. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437
F.3d 1085 (1 1th Cir. 2006), with Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir.
2004).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2003); see also 34 C.F.R. § 403(d) (2004).
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. Id. Specifically, the amendment authorizes reduction or denial of reimbursement
if the parent fails to provide notice at the most recent IEP meeting, or in writing ten
business days prior to the removal, that "they were rejecting the [district's proposed]
placement..., including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a
private school at public expense." Id. Although the effect is discretionary rather than
mandatory, most of the courts have adopted a strict, denial approach. See, e.g., Ms. M. v.
Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2004); Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist.,
348 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2003); Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21 (lst
Cir. 2002); Tracy v. Beaufort County Sch. Dist., 335 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D.S.C. 2004);
Schoenbach v. Dist. of Columbia, 309 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2004).
75. Various court and hearing/review officer decisions in cases arising before the
1997 Amendments provided additional, albeit indirect and interim, validation of the
Bernardsville timely-notice factor for tuition reimbursement. See, e.g., L.K. ex rel. J.H.
v. Bd. of Educ., 113 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D.N.C. 2000); Phillips v. Bd. of Educ., 25
IDELR 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Bd. of Educ. of New York City, 29 IDELR 143 (N.Y. SEA
1998); Bd. of Educ. of New York City, 23 IDELR 280 (N.Y. SEA 1995); cf Brillon Sch.
Dist., 25 IDELR 842 (Wis. 1996) (multi-factor approach).
76. It also appears to adopt the zero-period, rather than one-year interpretation of
Bernardsville. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Moreover, the amendment
[Vol. 110:4
COMPENSATORY EDUCATION UNDER THE IDEA
appears, in the selection of its deadline and contents, 7 to be rooted in the
reasoning of the MC. reasonable rectification factor for compensatory
education.7g
B. IDEA 2004
In addition to the Congressional actions and case law discussed
above,79 the most recent reauthorization of the IDEA further shows that
the Third Circuit is out-of-step with the intent of the IDEA. Specifically,
although the revisions of tuition reimbursement made only minor
refinements, g° the amendments explicitly provide, for the first time, a
statute of limitations for stages one (i.e., due process hearing)8' and two
(judicial review).8 2  For stage one, which is the relevant limitations
period here, the Act now specifically requires the parent's filing for a due
process hearing "within 2 years of the date the parent or public agency
knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis
of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for
requesting such a hearing ... in such time as the state law allows. 8 3 The
amendments also specify an equitable exception to this limitations period
where the district prevented the parent from requesting the hearing "due
to specific misrepresentations ... that [the district] had resolved the
problem forming the basis of the complaint, or... withholding of
expressly provides accompanying mitigating circumstances, such as failure of the district
to inform the parent of this notice requirement. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) (2003);
see also 34 C.F.R. § 403(e) (2004).
77. See supra note 74.
78. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 35, 53, 59-67, and 72-73.
80. Specifically, Congress divided the mitigating circumstances exceptions into two
categories-the first that precluded reducing or denying tuition reimbursement for certain
circumstances, such as the district preventing the parent from providing timely notice,
and the second that permitted reducing or denying tuition reimbursement in other
circumstances, such as the parent being illiterate and unable to write in English.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) (2005).
81. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (ninety days or period specified in state law).
82. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(C); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(6)(B).
83. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(C). This provision also triggers the date in terms of when the
district had actual or constructive knowledge, but that alternative, which is second in the
parallel construction for the parent or the district filing for the hearing, presumably
applies in the relatively rare, and here, irrelevant occasions when the district files for a
hearing. The legislative history clarifies that the broader alternative is for a state-
specified exception "through either statute or regulation ... [but] not ... [via] common
law determinations." S. Rep. 108-185, at 40 (2003). Said legislative history also
confirms the analogy to the point of integration: "This new provision is not intended to
alter the principle under IDEA that children may receive compensatory education
services, as affirmed in... Burlington ... and .. Carter... and otherwise limited under
[the tuition reimbursement section of the IDEA]." Id.
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information from the parent that was required... to be provided to the
parent." 84  Finally, at least indirectly recognizing equitable factors
relating to parental conduct, the amendments prescribe FAPE-forfeiting
consequences for the parents' failure to provide consent for initial special
education services.85
This new language concerning the limitations period, by applying
across the board, would seem to counter the Third Circuit's distinction
between compensatory education and tuition reimbursement. Moreover,
the exceptions, which overlap with the equitable specifications for tuition
reimbursement,86 tend to support the interweaving of these remedies.
Furthermore, although not mentioning the remedy of compensatory
education, Congress was presumably aware of this increasingly prevalent
remedy under the IDEA, and the specified two-year stage one limitations
period rejects the MC.-Ridgewood open-ended approach.87  The
additional new language reinforcing the role of parents, with FAPE-
forfeiting consequences for non-cooperating conduct, provides added
recognition of balancing the equities in FAPE matters, inferably
including remedies.
IV. Confusion and Resolution
The Third Circuit's cursory and unconvincing distinction between
tuition reimbursement and compensatory education has caused confusion
for the lower courts8 8 and hearing/review officers89 within its jurisdiction,
84. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(3)(D). Again, the required information presents a
possible ambiguity. Presumably, said information refers to district-required notification
prior to filing, specifically the procedural safeguards notice. Arguably, however, it also
includes other pre-filing district-required notifications, such as IEP progress reports.
85. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(III); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(5)(C).
86. See supra note 74.
87. Alternatively, the amendments clarify that the Third Circuit's accrual analysis, as
that of other jurisdictions, is merely to determine when the period begins to run, but not
to demarcate its limiting duration. See, e.g., James v. Upper Arlington City Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2000); Providence Sch. Dep't v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997); Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994); Dell v.
Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994).
88. The prime example concerns the limitations period for compensatory education.
Compare, e.g., Amanda v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR 260 (E.D. Pa. 2005);
Kristi H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. Pa. 2000), with David P. v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 23 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Montour Sch. Dist. v. S.T., 805
A.2d 29 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). For a more extensive identification and analysis,
including its effects on the Pennsylvania appeals panel, see Zirkel, supra note 19.
89. For example, in addition to the limitations period for compensatory education
(id.), the Pennsylvania appeals panel, which is the state's review officer tier under the
IDEA, is split with regard to whether the equities, more specifically the good or bad faith
of the parties' conduct, apply in compensatory education cases. Compare Cumberland
Valley Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR 79 (Pa. SEA 2004), Pottstown Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 113
(Pa. SEA 1998), with Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR 246 (Pa. SEA 2003); Se. Delco
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and has sown seeds of similar mischief in other jurisdictions.90 For
example, in a New Jersey federal district court decision, which the Third
Circuit summarily affirmed without opinion, the lower court applied,
with "difficulty," the M.C. edict that excluded "vigilance of the parents
(who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend the problem)"
as a relevant factor for triggering the period for compensatory
education. 91 In this case, specialized counsel represented the parents
during the formulation of the IEP and did not raise objections to its
procedural elements until after the start of the due process hearing,
whereupon the defendant district promptly and diligently corrected the
alleged deficiencies via the IEP team process.92  As a result, the court
declined to award compensatory education by equitably stretching the
Third Circuit's alternative standards for accrual93 and reasonable
rectification 94 and, thus, defacto considering the good faith, or vigilance,
of both parties.
The basic problem with the Third Circuit's rather ad hoc framework
appears to be the failure to apprehend and apply on a systematic basis the
analogy between tuition reimbursement, which has been subject to
Congressional codification, and compensatory education, which neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has yet to address.95 Indeed, the only
reference to compensatory education in the legislative history of the most
Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 108 (Pa. SEA 2001).
90. See, e.g., G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2003)
(citing Ridgewood for rejection of equitable limitations-here lack of parental notice-in
compensatory education calculus); Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. R., 321 F.3d 9, 18
(1st Cir. 2003) (citing M.C. accrual analysis for broader proposition); Diatta v. Dist. of
Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Ridgewood accrual analysis in
lieu of the court's previously adopted limitations period); cf Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park &
River Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 21 F. Supp. 2d 862,
880 (N.D. I11. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 207 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing M.C.
for rejection of compensatory education during entitlement ages).
91. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
92. D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 537 (D.N.J. 1997), afTd
mem., 159 F.3d 1350 (3d Cir. 1998).
93. Id. "We see no reason to find that the district should have known of any such
deficiencies in her IEP prior to that time, based upon the record in this case." Id.
94. Id. "Further, we find that the district responded in a timely manner to correct the
situation once they became aware of it." Id.
95. Moreover, the Third Circuit has not even been internally consistent with regard
to the subset or corollary of tuition reimbursement, which is reimbursement for an
independent educational evaluation (IEE). In Holmes v. Millcreek Township School
District, 205 F.3d 583, 591 (3d Cir. 2000), the court cited Bernardsville by analogy to
point out that the primary criterion is whether the district's evaluation was appropriate.
However, in Warren G. v. Cumberland County School District, 190 F.3d 80, 87 (3d Cir.
1998), the court roundly rejected any equitable consideration of the parents' failure to
object to the district's evaluation, although such consideration is warranted by the
Bernardsville analogy and is specified in the relevant IDEA regulation. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.502(b)(1).
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recent amendments to the IDEA premises the availability of this remedy
on the Supreme Court's Burlington-Carter tuition reimbursement
decisions.96 The core commonalities of tuition reimbursement and
compensatory education are established beyond dispute. First, both are
equitable remedies in the form of specialized injunctions under the
IDEA's broad grant for appropriate relief.97 Second, both are premised
on a denial of the eligible child's entitlement to FAPE, which is the
central feature of the Act.98 The limited difference lies in the parent's
election of remedies when faced with the perceived denial of FAPE. In
the case of tuition reimbursement, the parent elects the financial risk of a
unilateral private placement. 99 In the case of compensatory education,
the parent foregoes this risk, choosing to await the outcome of the Act's
"ponderous" review process1°° to determine whether the district has
denied the child FAPE. 101 Thus, compensatory education avoids the
second step of the tuition reimbursement analysis, which is whether the
parent's unilateral placement is appropriate. 1
02
This seemingly significant difference merits important
clarifications. First, as explained more fully elsewhere, 10 3 and generally
apprehended by the Third Circuit,1' 4 a parent has extraordinary
96. See supra note 83. Moreover, as this report further made clear, the limitations
period applies to each of these two interrelated remedies equally. S. Rep. No. 108-185, at
40. In contrast, conspicuously absent is any reference to the remedy of money damages.
97. See supra notes 23, 29, 31-33 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 22, 25, 31 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
102. This second step was the focus of Carter. See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
103. Lynn Daggett et al., For Whom the School Bell Tolls But Not the Statute of
Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. L.
REFORM 717 (2005). The Supreme Court has recognized the distinctive role of parents
under the IDEA. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988) ("[T]he Act
establishes various procedural safeguards that guarantee parents both an opportunity for
meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education and the right to seek
review of any decisions they think inappropriate."); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 205 (1982) (Congress gave parents "a large measure of participation at every stage
of the administrative process.").
104. Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1998).
Subsequent federal district court decisions in the Third Circuit follow, rather than
distinguish, the Collinsgru conclusion. For example, in a case for money damages and
injunctive relief, the district court cited Collinsgru in ruling that "[the parent] may not
bring suit on his own behalf under IDEA because ... he does not have substantive rights
under that Act." Carpenter v. Pennell Sch. Dist. Elementary Unit, 37 IDELR 157 (E.D.
Pa. 2002). In a later case, the same court upheld a compensatory education award for the
child but rejected a parent's right to proceed with her purportedly own substantive
reimbursement claim under the IDEA. Dombrowski v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 40
IDELR 39 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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procedural rights under the IDEA on behalf of the child, but the
substantive rights, including FAPE and the resultant remedies for its
denial, belong to the child, not the parents. That the parent receives the
tuition reimbursement, whereas the child receives the compensatory
education, is a difference without a distinction, resulting merely from
parental election on behalf of the child at the second step.105 In either
event, the child is the "rightful" beneficiary.
Second, the absence of step two in the analytical test for
compensatory education makes this remedy substantively easier, and yet
potentially more difficult procedurally, to obtain than tuition
reimbursement. It is easier substantively because there is no hurdle,
whether the burden of proof is on the parent or the district, 0 6 of proving
the appropriateness of an alternative plan the parent has elected over the
challenged district's program. It is potentially more difficult
procedurally if the preliminary procedural step of timely notice10 7 is
imported from tuition reimbursement to compensatory education claims.
The reason for notification in tuition reimbursement cases is that the
parent has taken high-stakes 0 8 unilateral action'09 warranting clear notice
105. Moreover, under the majority view within the Pennsylvania appeals panel, the
parent controls the choice of the place, time, and provider of compensatory education,
thus further reducing this superficial difference. See, e.g., Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 40
IDELR 246 (Pa. SEA 2003); Warren County Sch. Dist., 39 IDELR 284 (Pa. SEA
2003); Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR 116 (Pa. SEA 2002); Canon-McMillan Sch.
Dist., 36 IDELR 251 (Pa. SEA 2002); Whitehall-Coplay Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 254
(Pa. SEA 2001); Northern Lebanon Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 215 (Pa. SEA 2001);
Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 259 (Pa. SEA 2000). The majority view elsewhere
is that the IEP team makes these choices, which still provides a key, but partnering role to
the parent in determining the compensatory education. Zirkel, supra note 16, at 755-56.
106. An earlier commentary mistakenly characterized the burden of proof as being on
the parents at step one. Jean Bond, Making Up for Lost Time: The Third Circuit's Use of
Remedies for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 46 VILL. L.
REv. 777, 793 (2001). Rather, the Third Circuit generally puts the burden of persuasion
on the district, including the first step of tuition reimbursement analysis, but it has carved
out an exception at the second step, putting the burden on the parent to prove the
appropriateness of the unilateral placement. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d
520, 533 (3d Cir. 1995). This framework is appropriate. See Thomas Mayes et al., The
Burden of Proof under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L.
REv. 27 (2005). However, the Supreme Court's recent ruling that the burden of proof in
a FAPE case at the due process hearing level directly affects this first step and may
indirectly affect this second-step allocation. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
107. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
108. Although precise figures specific to tuition reimbursement are not available, the
average cost for special education students placed in nonpublic schools is twice that for
special education students generally. See Chambers et al., supra note 1, at Appendix B 1.
Moreover, the average cost for residential placement is more on the order of five times
the general per pupil cost for special education. Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 15, at 350.
109. For a rationale based specifically on the distinction of unilateral parental action,
thus creating a limited but cogent exception for the limited situation where the parent
seeks compensatory education after disenrolling the child, see Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 32
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to the district of its last-chance opportunity to have the IEP team to
resolve the matter, l10 thus avoiding the mutual risk of undue costs.
11
This risk is less acute for compensatory education because tuition
reimbursement relief tends to be all-or-nothing' 12-and even in the
relatively few partial awards the reduction is typically in units of
years' 13-whereas compensatory education is amenable to a much more
tailored approach based on days or hours."
14
The absence of step two warrants careful customization of the
analogy from tuition reimbursement to compensatory education within
the IDEA framework, which includes 1) FAPE as the primary purpose,
2) a broad grant of equitable remedial authority, 3) a pervasive
partnership between parents and districts via the IEP process, along with
the attendant procedural safeguards, and 4) codification of the
Burlington-Carter approach to tuition reimbursement. Specifically, the
recommended approach to compulsory education consists of various
elements based on the systematic application of the tuition
reimbursement analogy, which requires revision, but not reversal, of the
Third Circuit's leading position. These recommendations for
compensatory education have secondary implications for the remedy of
money damages.
A. Compensatory Education
First, the Third Circuit is correct that the substantive trigger for
IDLER 83 (Minn. SEA 1999) (citing Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 27 IDELR
469 (D. Minn. 1997) and Brantley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 26 IDELR 839 (D. Minn.
1997)).
110. The unilateral action of disenrollment does not provide such unambiguous notice
because parents may do so for various reasons unrelated to tuition reimbursement, such
as home schooling, change in residency, or enrollment in a private school-as the IDEA
recognizes (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A))-purely as a matter of choice.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 and 74-76.
112. For all published, conclusive decisions from September 1978 to August 2000,
the overwhelming majority (86%) was either completely in favor of the district (54%) or
the parent (32%). Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 15, at 355. For the period between the
1997 IDEA Amendments and August 2000, the corresponding figures were not
significantly different-85% completely in favor of either the district (56%) or the parent
(29%). Id. at 356.
113. For a rare exception where the court awarded half a year, see Kitchelt v. Weast,
341 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Md. 2004). Similarly, instances of published decisions that used
excess costs (see supra text accompanying note 30) as a basis for reductions within the
units of a year are relatively rare. See, e.g., River Forest Sch. Dist. No. 90 v. Illinois
State Bd. of Educ., 24 IDELR 36 (N.D. Ill. 1996); cf Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist.,
238 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2001) (consideration upon remand).
114. See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, Compensatory Educational Services in Special Education
Cases: An Update, 150 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 311, 324-25 (2001).
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compensatory education is denial of FAPE" 15 beyond a de minimis level,
without a requirement of gross or bad faith deprivation. Neither the
IDEA in its original form, nor its 1997 amendments that incorporated the
intervening Burlington-Carter interpretation, provide any support for the
competing, Second Circuit view that the denial must be gross.
16
Similarly, bad faith on the district's part, as on the parent's part, is part of
the balancing of the equities, not an essential element of the denial of
FAPE.
Second, in light of the absence of step two, timely notice should not
be a separable element for compensatory education;" 17 instead, it should
play a role only within the overall balancing of the equities in terms of
each side's behavior." 8  The Third Circuit was partially correct in
discounting this element, but it went too far by entirely relying on an
unwarranted assumption about the knowledgeability of the parents.11 9
Moreover, its repeated references to vigilance of the parents were limited
to the limitations period, not the calculation factors, for compensatory
education. 20 On the other side, the remainder of the Third Circuit's
analysis, mainly the deduction in the calculus for a reasonable
rectification period, is consistent with the notification element of tuition
reimbursement.'
2'
Third, an analysis of the equities fully applies to compensatory
education. 22 The absence of step two reinforces, rather than eliminates,
115. The Third Circuit is also quite correct in its "snapshot" approach for determining
whether the district met its FAPE obligation. Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993
F.3d 1031 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, contrary to an earlier commentary's
characterization (Bond, supra note 105, at 789, 795), the Third Circuit puts the burden of
persuasion on the district regarding the FAPE-denial issue, although the Supreme Court
has reversed this view. See supra note 105.
116. See, e.g., Garro v. State of Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994).
Alternatively, it may be that the Second Circuit's approach, at its roots, does not require
such a standard, instead being merely a confirmation of the general understanding that
procedural violations must be prejudicial, not merely technical or harmless error, and
that, indeed, complete denials of FAPE-as in Lester H.--clearly warrant compensatory
education. See, e.g., Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990); Burr v
Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071, 1075 (2d Cir. 1988) (Burr1).
117. For the relatively limited exception, see supra note 109.
118. For the rationale, see supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 92-94.
120. See supra notes 48, 51, 91 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying note 40. For recognition of this connection, see
Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 320, 323 n.50 (Pa. SEA 1998).
122. As a threshold general matter, the courts agree that compensatory education, like
tuition reimbursement, is an equitable matter. See, e.g., Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.
No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994); Bean v. Conway Sch. Dist., 18 IDELR 65 (D.N.H.
1991). After all, both are merely specialized, FAPE-based forms of injunction. See
Zirkel, supra note 17.
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the role of equity. 2 3 As a threshold matter, the 2004 IDEA amendments
have corrected the Third Circuit's confusing and open-ended accrual
analysis by specifying a fixed statute of limitations period that applies
cross the board, thus including compensatory education as well as tuition
reimbursement. 1 4  Next, given the special role of parents under the
IDEA generally, 125 and the inclusion of unreasonable parental conduct in
the codification of Burlington-Carter analysis specifically, 126 the good or
bad faith of parents merits equitable balancing against the behavior of the
district in the calculation of compensatory education. 127 The balancing
of the equities, which the Third Circuit rightly recognized as
"unavoidable" for tuition reimbursement under the broad framework of
the IDEA,128 is all the more unavoidable for compensatory education in
light of the Act's core emphasis on fostering cooperation between
parents and schools. 29 This balancing should take into consideration
such factors as whether the parents were represented by legal counsel or
otherwise knowledgeable about the rights under the IDEA, whether the
parents were passive or obstructive in the various mandated
responsibilities for participation on behalf of the child's FAPE, and
whether the district was responsive or deceptive in terms of its statutory
obligations, especially in facilitating the mandate for meaningful parental
123. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text note 83 and accompanying text. This new language also separates
and corrects accrual analysis, fixing the point as when the district or the parent knew or
should have known of the FAPE violation. Id. The legislative history reinforces the
application of the limitations period to each of these two remedies specifically. See supra
note 96. Incidentally, tolling should not apply to either compensatory education or
tuition reimbursement, which would judicially undo this new legislative provision. See
generally Daggett et al., supra note 103.
125. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 72 and accompanying text.
127. For decisions that have recognized the applicability of the equities in the
calculation of compensatory education, see Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994);
Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 27 IDELR 469 (D. Minn. 1997); cf Bd. of Educ. of
Christina Sch. Dist. v. RF, 40 IDELR 38 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003) (lack of notice).
128. See supra note 40. As aforementioned (supra text accompanying note 73),
Congress effectively corrected the Third Circuit's subsequent brief deviation in Warren
G.
129. In its landmark FAPE case under the IDEA, the Supreme Court concluded that
fostering cooperation between parents and schools was a primary purpose of the Act. Bd.
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). The subsequent lower court FAPE
decisions have repeated this central theme. See, e.g., Mr. and Mrs. D. v. Southington Bd.
of Educ., 119 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D. Conn. 2000); W.L.G. v. Riley, 975 F. Supp. 1317,
1329 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Leake v. Berkley County Bd. of Educ., 965 F. Supp. 838, 846
(N.D. W. Va. 1997). In its more recent decision under the IDEA, the Supreme Court
further reinforced the importance of parent-school cooperation by characterizing it as
"the core of [the IDEA]." Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 533 (2005).
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participation.13
0
Fourth, compensatory education need not-indeed should not-wait
for the child to reach the statutory ceiling of age 21 before
implementation of relief. The Third Circuit's dictum to the contrary in
Lester H.131 runs counter to the child's overriding need for prompt
FAPE.132  This language would be better understood as clarifying that
where the child's age is beyond the statutory ceiling, the claim for
compensatory education is not moot if based on a denial of FAPE during
the entitlement period.' 33 Similarly correcting another Lester H. dictum,
it is now clear than hearing/review officers have remedial authority to
grant not only tuition reimbursement, but also compensatory
education. 1
34
The Third Circuit has not yet addressed, but should take the lead in,
other issues integral to the remedy of compensatory education. For
example, once a hearing/review officer or court awards a specified
amount of compensatory education, who should be responsible for
determining its specific implementation, including what is delivered,
who delivers its, and when and where it is delivered? The Pennsylvania
appeals panel has addressed this issue, and its decisions have resulted in
130. In the most recent IDEA amendments, Congress added further emphasis on "the
parents' opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision
of [FAPE]." See supra note 12.
131. See supra note 34; cf John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 32 IDELR
142 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("compensatory education after age 21 would not satisfactorily
remedy denial of special services to [the student] during his crucial early educational
years").
132. See, e.g., Spiegler v. Dist. of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(quoting the principal Congressional author of what is now the IDEA, emphasizing that
"delay in resolving matters regarding the education program of a handicapped child is
extremely detrimental to his development.").
133. Another area of confusion, albeit not specific to the Third Circuit, is awarding
compensatory education during the school day in such a way as to merge with the
obligation to provide FAPE prospectively, thus effectively nullifying its compensatory
additive effect. See, e.g., Reese v. Bd. of Educ. of Bismarck R-V Sch. Dist., 225 F. Supp.
2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2002). Compensatory education, like tuition reimbursement, is
retrospective in its calculation. However, tuition reimbursement is implemented in a
lump sum payment, whereas the implementation of compensatory education is, by
necessity, more obviously prospective, warranting care to keep it separate from the
district's ongoing FAPE obligation. See, e.g., Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B.,
807 F. Supp. 860, 869 (D.N.H. 1992) ("an award which requires a [district] to provide a
student education services during a period of time in which it is already obligated to
provide that student a free appropriate education does not constitute an award of
compensatory education under the Act.").
134. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. However, these remedies are
separate, not simultaneous; they should not be awarded for the same denial of FAPE.
See, e.g., Kenston Local Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR 47 (Ohio SEA 2003); Upper Perkiomen
Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR 115 (Pa. SEA 2003); North Penn Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR 109 (Pa.
SEA 2003).
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two competing answers. One view is that the parents should have the
discretion to decide these implementation issues based on the rationale
that 1) the district defaulted on its FAPE obligation, and 2) the IDEA
grants parents sole authority in other important areas, such as selecting
independent educational evaluations (IEEs), their attorneys, and the
unilateral placements that lead to step two of tuition reimbursement
analysis. 35  The other, and preferable, view is that the IEP team,
representing the core collaborative 136 vehicle for FAPE,131 should
shoulder the responsibility for such implementation issues. 3  The
reasons for this view are that 1) the district's default should revert to the
mandated IEP process that is central to the Act and that sets the tone for
the continuing relationship of the parties in terms of the child's
135. See, e.g., Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 251 (Pa. SEA 2002). The
alternate rationale is based on the analogy to tuition reimbursement, which runs counter
to the related and false dichotomy between student and parent remedies. See, e.g.,
Northern Lebanon Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 215 (Pa. SEA 2001). In any event, under this
view the only limitation is cost based on salaries and fringe benefits the district would
have expended to provide these services. See, e.g., Warren County Sch. Dist., 39 IDELR
284 (Pa. SEA 2003). The problem is that if the district disputes the costs, it will have to
re-invoke the due process hearing procedure of the Act, thus entailing more adversariness
and transaction costs.
136. See supra note 129.
137. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988):
Envisioning the IEP as the centerpiece of the statute's education delivery
system for disabled children, and aware that schools had all too often denied
such children appropriate educations without in any way consulting their
parents, Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance
and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of
the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness. . . . Accordingly,
the Act establishes various procedural safeguards that guarantee parents both an
opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's
education and the right to seek review of any decisions they think
inappropriate.
Id.
138. See, e.g., Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 139 (Pa. SEA 2000). In other
jurisdictions, there is much more support for this approach than for the parent view. See,
e.g., Simms v. Dist. of Columbia, 44 IDELR 41 (D.D.C. 2005); Blackman v. Dist. of
Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D.D.C. 2005); Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003); Melvin v. Town of Bolton Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 1189 (D. Vt.
1993), affd mem., 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1996); State of Connecticut Unified Dist. No. 1
v. State Dep't of Educ., 699 A.2d 1077 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997); Los Angeles Unified
Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR 293 (Cal. SEA 2002); Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR
51 (Cal. SEA 2002); San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 198 (Cal. SEA 2002);
Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 105 (Cal. SEA 1999); Christina Sch.
Dist., 43 IDELR 233 (Del. SEA 2005); Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 37
IDELR 209 (Ill. SEA 2002); Pemberton Twp. Bd. of Educ., 35 IDELR 24 (N.J. SEA
2001); Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR 250 (Tex. SEA 2004); Garland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 38 IDELR 79 (Tex. SEA 2002); Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 252
(Tex. SEA 2002). But cf Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(hearing officer may not delegate to the IEP team authority to reduce or discontinue the
award due to prohibition of hearing officer being a district employee).
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entitlement to FAPE; 2) in contrast to compensatory education, parents
unrestricted selection of IEEs and attorneys are at their own expense and
risk, with districts only responsible for subsequent payment upon limited
conditions; and 3) tuition reimbursement, which is the most applicable
analogy, required-in addition to denial of FAPE and the balancing of
the equities-the added condition that the parent's choice was
appropriate. Giving parents the unrestricted discretion to choose the
what, when, and where of compensatory education-particularly when
the child's needs and IEP have likely changed-with the only risk being
further litigation to challenge their choice, is neither fitting nor prudent.
A final example is perhaps the most difficult issue of all-whether
compensatory education should merely be a mechanical, hour-for-hour
formula 139 or, as the D.C. Circuit recently ruled, a flexible, qualitative
approach. 140  Citing the Burlington and Carter decisions' reference to
"equitable considerations," the D.C. circuit ruled that "the ultimate award
must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that
likely would have accrued from special education services the school
district should have supplied in the first place. 1 4 1 Although appealing in
terms of the Rowley substantive standard for FAPE, this standard may
prove unworkable due to the passage of time resulting from the Act's
"ponderous" dispute resolution process, including problems such as
1) the child's changed needs from the time of the disputed IEP to the
issuance of the award, 2) the overlapping standard for the child's new
IEP, and 3) the ultimately "soft" state of the art with regard to what is
reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. 142  The broad
definition of "specially designed instruction," which is the heart of
FAPE, is "hopelessly ambiguous," leading to "vastly divergent
139. It is at least arguable that the Third Circuit's reference to "a period equal to the
period of deprivation" was merely a gross preliminary calculation, awaiting more refined
and definitive analysis. M.C. v. Cent. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1996).
140. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523-24 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also
Branham v. Dist. of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
141. Reid, 401 F.3d at 524. Acknowledging that the award might in some cases be
notably shorter than the hour-by-hour calculation and in other cases even more, the court
included equitable consideration of the parties' conduct and the M.C. reasonable-
rectification adjustment in its analysis. Id.
142. For example, an empirical study found a statistically significant difference
between the final administrative (i.e., hearing or review officer) decision and the ultimate
court decision in a representative sample of published cases under the IDEA. James
Newcomer & Perry Zirkel, An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases,
65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 469 (1999). In this author's fifteen years of experience as an
IDEA review officer and his twenty-five years of experience doing research on special
education cases, I have often found that what was appropriate under the Rowley standard
depended on who was the impartial decision maker in the case; thus, the respective
parties-given their skewed perspectives and entrenched positions-often found the
outcome to be unpredictable.
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interpretations" among decision makers. 143
B. Money Damages
Given the rather complete role of tuition reimbursement and
compensatory education in fulfilling the IDEA's equitable grant of
remedial authority, 44 as well as the prevailing view that § 504 and the
ADA provide for money damages for intentional discrimination (i.e.,
gross misjudgment, bad faith, or deliberate indifference) 45 the Third
Circuit should reverse its view that § 1983 provides an avenue for money
damages under the IDEA.
146
Conclusion
The Third Circuit has the opportunity to provide plenary leadership,
not partial mis-leadership, in tailoring the fabric of the IDEA's equitable
grant of "appropriate relief' into a customized, rather than patchwork- or
crazy-, quilt. Regardless of whether the Third Circuit fulfills this role,
lower courts elsewhere, and ultimately the Supreme Court or Congress,
need to sculpt a comprehensive and coherent approach to IDEA remedies
that focuses the limited resources under this funding statute 147 for the
prompt provision of FAPE to students with disabilities, 48 leaving
monetary liability to the alternate claims available under civil rights
legislation and common law torts. As the immediate priority, the
emerging primary remedy of compensatory education should be carefully
tailored to be consistent with, and informed by, the Supreme Court's and
Congress's formulation of tuition reimbursement.
143. Robert A. Garda, The New IDEA: Shifting Educational Paradigms to Achieve
Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1106 (2005).
144. Of course, declaratory and more general injunctive relief are available to fill the
gaps, such as ruling that a district has violated its duties with regard to determining
eligibility or proposing placement and prospectively ordering the IEP team to evaluate
the child or propose a different placement. See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 17.
145. See supra notes 63-64.
146. See supra note 96 and text accompanying notes 59-60 and 65-67. The court's
favoring of the alternatives of compensatory education or tuition reimbursement was .a
step in the right direction. See supra note 60. Moreover, the court should incorporate
this qualifying standard for § 504 and the ADA claims, whether based on § 1983 or not.
See supra text accompanying notes 61-64; see also Allan Osborne, Remedies for a School
District's Failure to Provide Services under the IDEA, 112 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 1, 20
(1996).
147. See supra text accompanying note 1.
148. See supra note 130. For the need for prompt dispute resolution more generally
under the IDEA, see Perry Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195
EDUC. L. REP. (West) 35 (2005); Perry Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REv. 403 (1994).
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